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CASES NOTED
in confiscated slot machines which were held to have become part of the
illegal device and thus subject to forfeiture; whereas in the instant case the
court admitted that a statute 2 forbids forfeiture of the gambling funds
involved. 23 Rather than viewing the illegal act as a collateral matter the
court here held that the reason for the seizure was a necessary element of the
plaintiff's case and therefore denied recovery.
The instant decision when thus stripped of its allegedly supporting
authority seems to have only public policy24 to justify new law creating, in
effect, a forfeiture in contravention of statute.25  It is submitted that the
effect of this Draconian ruling will be to predicate the penalty of the gambler
on the vigilance of the law-enforcement officers and on the stake of the
game, regardless of any statute regulating such penalties predicated upon
the grade of immorality or frequency of violation. ", Also, following the
holding to its logical conclusion, it may even become possible for the gov-
ernment to refuse to deliver up an auto towed to the city pound in pursu-
ance of modern parking ordinances.27 All this may result without any answer
to the question tactfully evaded in the decision: just what can be done with
this money?25
ZONING-DISCONTINUANCE OF NONCONFORMING USE
The village clerk refused a permit to reopen a gasoline service station on
petitioner's premises, located in a residential zone. Held, a zoning ordinance
prohibiting resumption of a nonconforming use discontinued 12 or more
months is constitutional. Franmore Realty Corp. v. LeBoeuf, 104 N.Y.S.2d
247 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
A nonconforming use' is included in those "bundles of rights"12 which
22. CAL. PEN. CoDE, suPra note 1.
23. Lee On v. Long, 234 P.2d 9, 11 (Cal. 1951).
24. Possibly influenced by the semi-hysteria created by the disclosures of the wide-
spread prevalency and corruption of gambling as exposed by the Senate Crime investigation
Committee (popularly, Kefauver Committee) created by Sen. Res. 202, introduced, 96
CoNe. REc. 6149 (1950).
25. As to whether this can be construed as a forfeiture, see opinion of Justice Augus-
tus N. Hand in Judson v. Buckley, 130 F.2d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 1942): "Suit for recovery
[is] not barred . . . where the res sought to be recovered is held in escrow ...so that
a refusal to act in favor of the complainant will amount to an affirmative action in favor
of the other party."
26. Will not the professional gambler be "penalized" less, since the custom of the
profession is to use chips?
27. As suggested by the dissenting opinion, Lee On v. Long, supra note 23, at 13.
28. Such as, i. e., can the state have the use of the money? Th interest? Would
it be a crine if the plaintiffs were to regain possession of this money by self help? And
what are the present responsibilities of the holder of this money?
1. A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective date of the zoning
restriction and continuing since that time in nonconformance to the ordinance. Darling
v. Zoning Board of Adiustment of City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 428, 54 A.2d 829
(1947); Appeal of -laller Baking Co., 295 Pa. 257, 145 A. 77 (1928). 8 McQuz.LAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.185 (3d ed. 1950). See Beyer v. Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765 (1943).
2. POUND & PLUGINETT, READINGS ON TIlE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MoN LAw 638 (3d ed. 1927).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
collectively comprise a legally protected interest. However, the rights con-
templated by zoning measures to continue nonconformiing uses arc not per-
petual. They are incorporeal hereditaments and as such may be lost by
abandonment 5 or discontinuance.,
Generally a right to continue a nonconforming use is not easily extin-
guished. Courts are traditionally solicitous of property rights and in the
absence of statutory language to the contraryj require more than mere non-
use before such rights are lost 8  To constitute an abandonment there must
be a concurrence of two factors: one is an intention to abandon, the other
some overt act or failure to act indicating a surrender of the use?
Although zoning ordinances arc in derogation of the common law
right to employ one's property to its maximuni utility,10 there is no question
today as to their constitutionality.1  The police power is the basis of limit-
ing the use of real estate provided the regulations bear a substantial relation-
ship to health, safety, morals or general welfare and are not unreasonable or
arbitrary 1 2
The policy of zoning laws is the gradual elimination of nonconforming
uses.' 3  The liberal constructions so frustrating to this policy have been
checked by the inclusion of statutory limitation periods in municipal zoning
ordinances such as the one in the instant case.' Express provisions that
mere non-use for a specified period should be considered a discontinuance 5
3. Dorman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 678, 51 A.2d 658(1946), 8 MCQUILLAN op. cit. sUPra note l; § 25.183.
4. POUND, READINGS ON T]E 111STORY AND SYSTEMs OF TIlE Com.moN LAw 573
(2d ed. 1921).
5. State v. Turner, 234 Ala. 286, 174 So. 514 (1937).
6. Beszcdes v. Board of Comm'rs, 116 Colo, 123, 178 P.2d 950 (1947); Civic Ass'n
of Dearborn Tp. v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97 (1947).
7, Emphasis supplied by writer.
8. Landay v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293 (1938); ef. City of Bing-
hamton v. Cartel], 275 App. Div. 457, 460, 90 N.Y.S.2d 556, 559 (1949) (mere non-
use unaccompanied by intent to abandon does not prevent resumption); accord, Camp-
bell v. Board of Adjustment, 118 N.I.L. 116, 191 A. 742 (1937).
9. Landay v. MacWilliams, supra note 8; ef. Wood v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d
67 (D. C. Mun. App. 1944). 8 McQUILL N, op. cit. supra note I, § 25.192.
10. See Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 260 N. Y. 339, 341, 194 N. E. 848, 850
(1935).
11. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La.
271. 97 So. 440 (1923).
12. E.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 11; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
13. See Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 655, 222 P. 623, 624 (1923) ("The
ultimate purpose ... [of zoning ordinances] is plainly that nonconforming uses shall
gradually be eliminated . . ."); accord, State v. Casper, 5 N. J. Super. 150, 68 A.2d 545
(1949); But cf. ltaulenbeek v. Allcnhurst, 136 N. J. L. 557, 57 A.2d 52 (1948).
14. Franmore Realty Corp. v. LeBoeuf, 104 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
"No conforming use which shall have been discontinued for a period exceeding twelve
(12) months shall be resumed nor shall it be replaced by another nonconforming use."
15. Despite attempts to distinguish "discontinuance" and "abandonment," see Lan-
day v. MacWilliams, supra note 8, (discontinuance witiout evidence of intent to abandon
Nuould not prevent resumption of nononformting use) the reasoning and language of the
majority of cases and ordinances sustain the contention that the terms are synonymous.
See, e.g., Navin v. Early, 56 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (Sup. Ct. 1945) [not officially reported]
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have been held. constitutional. 1 In construing ordinances without statutory
limitations, courts have intimated such provisions would be valid.' 7
A 1946 Florida case' 8 involving an ordinance'' similar to the one in the
principal case reached an opposite result. A nonconforming use suspended
by military necessity was permitted to resume because the cessation was by
superior authority, involuntary and by no act of any one in privity with the
landowner. Thc decision can be justified only on equitable grounds, for the
distinction between suspension by order of an administrative agency and
war time restrictions imposed on the use of gasoline is hardly reconcilable.
Citing the inadcquate language in a prior case, 20 the Florida court
nevertheless declined to clarify the application of the terms abandonment
and discontinuance.?- 1 The instant New York decision resolved the issue
squarely by conceding the absence of voluntary abandonment, preternitting
it in view of the explicit terms of the ordinance.
The courts have gone much further than the termination of a noncon-
forming use after a specified period. In a very recent case an ordinance
requiring the discontinuance of the plaintiff's service station within 10 years
was held a legitimate exercise of the police power of a municipality. It is
significant that the famous Dema Realty Cases2 3 have. been much criticized
chiefly because of the "unreasonable time" allowed for the liquidation of a
going business 24 rather than for the sweeping effect of the ordinance.
(discontinuance connoted a voluntary act and is synonymous with abandonment); Ullman
v. Payne, 127 Conn. 239, 240, 16 A.2d 286, 287 (1940); Appeal of Haller Baking Co.,
295 Pa. 257, 259, 145 A. 77, 79 (1928); State v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 123, 238
N.W. 835, 837 (1931).
16. Beszedes v. Board of Comm'rs, supra note 6, (conformance required after non-
use for one year); Wilson v. Edgar, supra note 13, (conformance required after non-use
for 180 days).
17. City of Binghamton v. Gartell, supra note 8 at 460, 90 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
"T.'here is no provision in the ordinance ...that mere non-use for any specified period
should be considered a discontinuance . . . unless so stated ...discontinuance of a non-
conforming use without evidence of an intent to abandon, will not prevent its resump-
tion." Quoting from and citing with approval Landay v. MacWilliams, snpra note 8.
18. Crandon v. State, 158 Fla. 133, 28 So.2d 159 (1946) (operation of airport inter-
rupted by order of Civil Aeronautics Authority during war years).
19. Dade County, Fla. Zoning Resolution, § 34 (1938) (six months).
20. Miami Beach v. State, 128 Fla. 118, 120, 174 So. 443, 445 (1937) ("We do
not construe the word 'discontinued' to mean a temporary cessation.-, but it means ,lat
it says, a discontinuance of business of that sort at that place.").
21. Crandon v. State, supra note 18 at 134, 174 So. at 445 ("We arc not required to
determine whether 'discontinuance' . . . contemplates an intent to abandon ...Neither
are we required to say that discontinuance is synonymous with abandonment").
22. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U. S. 892 (1950) (service stations in area to be discontinued in ten years). But see
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Sprague, supra note 12. to the effect that zoning ordinances
ordinarily have no retroactive effect and work no disturbance with existing uses of property.
23. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280
U.S. 556 (1929); Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby. 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) (re-
moval of existing business within one year. Two justices dissented onl procedural grounds;
a third did not state grounds).
24. Franmore Realty Corp. v. LeBoeuf, supra note 14 at 253.
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The holding in the instant case reflects the trend toward effectuating
the purpose of municipal zoning and the spirit of city planning. 5 Such
juridical integrity in the face of equitable suasion is commendable.
25. Zoning and planning are not interchangeable terms; city planning ". . . em-
braces the entire group of complex urban problems . . . Zoning is the machinery by which
part of the plan can be accomplished." Bartley & Boyer, Municipal Zoning: Florida Law
and Practice, U. of Fla. Public Adm. Clearing Service p. 9 (1950). (An excellent com-
prehensive survey of Florida zoning).
